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The Ethics of Vaginal Birth after Cesarean 
By Sonya Charles 
 
Once a cesarean, always a cesarean. Or so, at any rate, obstetricians long thought and practiced. 
Questions were raised about this belief as early as the 1960s, but it was not until after a National 
Institutes of Health consensus conference in 1980 that vaginal birth after cesarean rates began 
to significantly increase.1 The trend toward VBAC peaked around 1996, when approximately 28.3 
percent of women with a previous cesarean had a vaginal birth. Shortly after, however, 
obstetricians began to raise questions about the safety of VBAC. Specifically, they were 
concerned about professional liability in response to an increase in reports of uterine rupture and 
other complications resulting from a trial of labor after cesarean.2 In 1998, the American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists released new, more restrictive guidelines for attending any 
woman who attempts a trial of labor after cesarean. By 2004, the VBAC rate had fallen to 9.2 
percent.3 
The decline in providers and facilities that will allow a trial of labor after cesarean forces many 
women to choose a repeat cesarean. The choice is frequently not much of a choice, however, 
since the full range of options are often not on the table. This limited “choice” violates obstetricians’ 
obligations both to respect patients’ autonomy and to offer them good care. 
There has been a vigorous but so far not very fruitful debate in the last few years about the lack 
of access to a trial of labor after cesarean. In March 2010, the NIH released another consensus 
statement on VBAC, expressing concern about the limited access women have to clinicians and 
facilities willing to offer a trial of labor after cesarean and calling for various stakeholders to work 
together to mitigate or eliminate these barriers.4 In August 2010, ACOG released new practice 
VBAC guidelines that were more permissive than the previous guidelines, but failed to address 
what many (including ACOG) recognized as a major barrier to access—the requirement that 
anesthesia and surgery be “immediately available.”5 This means that any provider/hospital 
wishing to offer VBAC must be prepared to do emergency surgery. Due to a lack of resources, 
not all hospitals can meet this requirement. For example, the NIH report specifically mentions a 
lack of anesthesia staff resources to ensure “immediate” access.6 As long as this requirement 
remains, it is unlikely that access to VBAC will significantly improve. In the new guidelines, ACOG 
reiterates its commitment to patient autonomy and reaffirms a woman’s right to choose increased 
risks, but, in practice, liability issues will pressure physicians and facilities to comply with ACOG 
guidelines. The response to ACOG’s 2010 guidelines by the American College of Nurse-Midwives 
nicely summarizes the problem: “It is unclear how these fully informed women will be at liberty to 
choose a TOLAC [trial of labor after cesarean] when facilities continue to refuse them this option, 
claiming compliance with the 2010 ACOG guidelines.”7 Therefore, access to VBAC is likely to 
remain a problem for the foreseeable future. 
 
The Problem 
Even though the number of providers and facilities that will allow a trial of labor after cesarean 
has declined, there are still many women who want this option. In fact, many women will go to 
great lengths to avoid a repeat cesarean. In her review of the current state of maternity care, 
Jennifer Block tells of women who labor in the hospital parking lot, refusing to be admitted until 
they are too far along to have surgery, and other women who fly in midwives who will attend a 
VBAC at home from another part of the country. She also describes a growing number of women 
who simply opt out of the medical system altogether and attempt an unassisted birth at home 
because they can find no skilled birth attendant willing to allow a trial of labor.8 
But while some women go to great lengths to avoid a repeat cesarean, others are not willing to 
take what they see as unacceptable risks. When they are faced with a medical establishment that 
refuses to allow them a trial of labor, they reluctantly consent to surgery. These are the cases I 
will focus on.  
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There is some debate over which women are good candidates for a trial of labor after 
cesarean—which women have a reasonable chance of success, according to the medical 
evidence, and low overall risk of harm. For the purposes of this paper, my arguments apply only 
to those women deemed most eligible—namely, women who have had one previous cesarean 
using a low transverse uterine incision and who have no pregnancy complications that would 
otherwise indicate a need for surgical delivery.9 
According to standard accounts of bioethics, informed consent consists of three components—
competence, understanding, and voluntariness. We can assume the vast majority of these women 
are competent. It is also the case that many women who desperately want to attempt a VBAC 
have done their research. They have a good understanding of the potential risks and benefits for 
both VBAC and repeat cesarean.10 But if there are no providers or facilities that will allow a trial 
of labor, how can we say their choice of a repeat cesarean is voluntary? 
Consider the imaginary case of Susan, a well-educated, middle-class woman who is pregnant 
with her second child. Her first child was in breech presentation, so she delivered via cesarean 
section. For this pregnancy, she had hoped to attempt a VBAC. However, when she started 
looking for providers, she discovered that the closest hospital that would allow a trial of labor was 
two hundred miles away. It would be difficult to use this facility for labor and delivery under the 
best of circumstances, but having a toddler at home during the time she would go into labor makes 
it completely un-11 workable. Her state does not allow midwives who do home births to attend 
VBACs, but even if they did, she is not comfortable with this option. While she knows the absolute 
risk of a catastrophic event during a trial of labor is low, she still prefers to be in a medical facility. 
After reconciling herself to these facts, she signs on with a friendly obstetrician at the hospital 
nearest to her house and grudgingly consents to a repeat cesarean. 
In a case such as this, I argue that Susan was forced by the circumstances into having another 
major surgery. Given the lack of providers and facilities willing to allow a trial of labor after 
cesarean, she cannot effectively choose what would be a reasonable medical option. For this 
reason, we should question the voluntariness of her consent. Unfortunately, there are many 
women in circumstances similar to Susan’s, which is to say that there are many women whose 
autonomy is undermined by lack of access to a trial of labor after cesarean. This is a situation that 
should be of great concern to both obstetricians and the bioethics community. 
 
Obstetrical Ethics 
For a theory of obstetrical ethics, I draw on the work of Frank Chervenak and Laurence 
McCullough.12 I use their theory for two reasons. First, theirs is the most thorough account I know 
of obstretrical ethics (versus general accounts of medical ethics or physician-patient 
relationships). Second, of obstetrician-patient conflict. When considering conflicts between an 
obstetrician and a patient, they focus on autonomy and beneficence. Like other ethicists, they put 
significant weight on respect for autonomy, but they recognize that it is not an absolute right. In 
cases where a patient’s autonomy involves the help of the physician, we must also consider the 
role of beneficence. 
Given our commitment to autonomy and a patient’s right to refuse treatment, most bioethicists 
would agree that a patient has a near-absolute right to refuse treatment and leave the hospital. 
(For the sake of argument, we will assume the patient is competent and capable of leaving without 
assistance.) As Chervenak and McCullough explain, a patient who refuses treatment and 
withdraws from care is exercising a negative right to be left alone. This right is nearly absolute. 
However, if the patient refuses one treatment (for example, surgical delivery), but remains under 
the physician’s care, then she is effectively requesting an alternative treatment (such as vaginal 
delivery)—which is a positive right. Whenever a patient invokes a positive right to an alternative 
form of medical management, the physician has some say in whether to participate. Thus, 
autonomous choices that invoke positive rights are more restricted. 
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When a patient requests an alternative form of medical management, the physician can refuse 
unless the requested treatment is in keeping with what Chervenak and McCullough call the 
beneficence model. Under the beneficence model, a physician cannot refuse a patient’s request 
for alternative treatment as long as the treatment is reasonable, by which they mean that it has 
the potential to have some benefit to the patient. To lessen the creep of personal bias by the 
physician and to clarify the relationship between beneficence and reason, they define the 
beneficence model in this way: 
The beneficence model makes a peculiar claim: to interpret reliably the interests of any patient 
from medicine’s perspective. This perspective is provided by accumulated scientific research, 
clinical experience, and reasoned responses to uncertainty. It is thus not a perspective 
peculiar or idiosyncratic to any particular physician.13 
Based on this model, the physician cannot refuse to accommodate any request for alternative 
treatment that is supported by scientific research and clinical experience. This point is crucial 
because it shows that a significant number of women should have a right to request a trial of labor 
after cesarean. A last criterion about reasoned responses to uncertainty has to do with the nature of 
clinical judgments. Since many prognoses are based on statistical evidence, there is always room 
for error. However, when making these decisions, Chervenak and McCullough argue, we only need 
to be reasonably certain that the therapy will have some benefit (or not cause harm) based on 
scientific and clinical evidence. 
Chervenak and McCullough pose the example of a woman who refuses a cesarean after being 
diagnosed with complete placenta previa. In this case, the potential for harm both to the woman and 
to the fetus is significant, and there appears to be no clinical benefit to attempting a vaginal delivery. 
The woman therefore does not have an autonomous right to request that a physician assist her in a 
vaginal delivery because doing so would violate the beneficence model. 
They contrast this case to that of a patient who refuses surgery for a gangrenous toe. While 
research shows a better outcome with surgical treatment for gangrene, scientific and clinical 
experience show medical management can also work. Therefore, even though the physician may 
believe surgery is a better option, participating in medical management does not ask the physician to 
violate the beneficence model.  
The question, then, is whether a trial of labor after cesarean violates the beneficence model. 
In March 2010, a multidisciplinary group convened by the NIH completed a consensus statement on 
VBAC, comprising a review and summary of the latest scientific evidence and recommendations for 
both practice and research. It concluded that, “Given the available evidence, trial of labor is a 
reasonable option for many pregnant women with one prior low transverse uterine incision.”14 A 
primary concern raised by obstetricians when considering a trial of labor after cesarean is the 
possibility of uterine rupture. According to ACOG’s own statistics, however, when the woman has a 
low transverse uterine incision, the risk of uterine rupture is less than 1 percent,15 and in the studies 
reviewed by the NIH group, there were no maternal deaths as a result of uterine rupture. The risk is 
slightly higher for the fetus. In the case of uterine rupture, there was a 3 percent risk of fetal death for 
term infants. While not insignificant, we can see that this is still a very low risk of fetal death. 
Another complicating factor when deciding about a trial of labor after cesarean has to do with 
the hierarchy of potential outcomes. If we review the overall clinical outcomes for women who had a 
previous cesarean, VBAC has the best outcomes, elective repeat cesarean comes next, and failed 
trial of labor followed by emergency cesarean ranks last.16 For this reason, obstetricians often believe 
that elective cesarean section is the most reasonable option. While it is true that the relative risk of 
complications and poor outcomes is higher with an emergency compared to a scheduled cesarean 
section, the absolute risk with both procedures is still statistically low.17 Also, 60 to 80 percent of 
women who attempt a trial of labor after cesarean will have a successful vaginal delivery—the best 
outcome.18  
Given the evidence, a woman who meets the general criteria and wishes a trial of labor is not 
making an unreasonable or irrational request. According to Chervenak and McCullough, the patient’s 
decision does not have to coincide with what the physician believes is the best option. The 
requirement of the beneficence model is less cumbersome. The patient must only make a decision 
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that is reasonable—that is, a decision that has “a not-insignificant rate of success” and is consistent 
“with promoting the interests of the patient as construed in the beneficence model.”19 Current 
research shows that a trial of labor for women who had a low transverse uterine incision meets these 
criteria. Indeed, if the trial of labor is successful, then the woman will have achieved the best 
possible clinical outcome. 
 
The Obstetrician’s Role 
A trial of labor after cesarean is a reasonable-enough option that women have an autonomous right 
to choose it, and physicians have no moral reason to refuse assistance. Not only does a trial of labor 
meet the beneficence model’s criteria, but, based on the evidence, it appears to be a less harmful 
option than repeat cesarean. According to the NIH consensus report, “women who have a trial of 
labor, regardless of ultimate mode of delivery, are at decreased risk of maternal mortality compared 
to elective repeat cesarean delivery.”20 The benefits of VBAC are even more important for women 
who plan to continue having children. Allowing these women to have a vaginal birth instead of three, 
four, or five cesareans dramatically reduces their chances of further complications.21 Given this 
evidence, structural barriers that limit access to VBAC are keeping obstetricians from providing 
optimal care.  
In such a situation, obstetricians (along with professional organizations like ACOG) have a 
moral obligation to change these policies to allow a trial of labor after cesarean. VBAC 
supporters argue that the ACOG guidelines are largely responsible for limiting access. 
According to the NIH report, 30 percent of surveyed hospitals stopped offering a trial of labor 
after cesarean after ACOG first issued the requirement that emergency surgery be “immediately 
available.” Some even referred to this as a “VBAC ban.”22 Given the significant role ACOG has 
played in reducing access to a trial of labor after cesarean, they have an even greater moral 
obligation to help eliminate these barriers. To do so not only supports patient autonomy, but 
also allows obstetricians to provide optimal care.  
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